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ESSAY

THE CASE OF THE SPELUNCEAN POLLUTERS: SIX
THEMES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND ETHICS
By'
J.: B. RuHL*
Almost as soon as it was invented in the early 1970s, the United States' modern environmentallawframework has been the subject of callsfor reform. Six
divergent reform approachespredominate that debate today, and behind each
lies strongly held policy and ethical perspectives. Using thefuturistic setting
Lon Fuller created in his classic study of legal theory, The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers,ProfessorJ.B. Ruhl pits those environmental law approaches againsteach other as society finds itself on the day of reckoningfor
the environment in the year 4310 AD. The discovery many centuries earlier
of a remarkablesubstance, placidium, had allowed society to make resource
use decisions without environmental consequences, or so it seemed. But the
supply of placidium has run dry, and the Supreme Court must decide the
framework for making environmental policy decisions for the now precarious future. Not surprisingly, the Court confronts the same divided perspec* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern minois University. LL.M. in Environmental Law
1986, George Washington University; J.D. 1982, B.A. 1979, University of Virginia. I have
modeled this Essay on Professor Lon Fuller's masterful exploration of the various paradigns of legal theory that prevailed in the middle of this century. See Lon Fuller, The Case of
ithe Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. Ruv. 616 (1949). Perhaps as much as is true in legal
theory, and probably more so than for any other substantive field of law, environmental law
encompasses many schools of thought proceeding from vastly different, often sharply conflicting premises of what is the "right thing" to do with respect to law and policy. Professor
Fuller's fictitious setting of the Commonwealth of Newgarth in the year 4300 A.D., and of a
supreme court deciding an unsolvable puzzle of law, thus provide a fitting vehicle to explore
contrasting jurisprudential theories of environmental law in their clearest and starkest
forms. In keeping with the spirit and format of Professor Fuller's thoroughly enjoyable work,
this is the first and last footnote in The Case of the Speluncean Polluters! This is not to
suggest, of course, that others have not shaped and contributed to my attempt to summarize
the richness and diversity of environmental jurisprudence, but only that they are too numerous to identify through the traditional means of footnotes. Therefore, a suggested reading
list is supplied at the conclusion of the Essay. I owe special thanks to Pat Kelley, Fred
Cheever, and John Nagle for their insights on early drafts of this Essay
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tives we find in play today, on the brink of the second millennium. As we
have no substance like placidium on our horizon, and 'many believe the environment can withstand no more of humanity's demands, perhaps we can
learn somethingfrom the Court's opinion of the future.

In the Supreme Court of Newgarth, 4310 A.D. The parties, having
participated in the administrative proceedings of the Environment Agency
and in the judicial review proceedings of the District Court and Intermedi'ate Court below, brought these appeals, and we granted review. The facts
sufficiently appear in the opinion of the Chief Justice.
MS. CHIEF JUSTICE COSBEN,

with whom MR. JUSTICE RiscANLys and Ms.

JUSTICE REGULADO join, delivered the following opinion.

It was only ten years ago that the demise of Roger Whetmore at the
hands of his fellow spelunkers, in what is now known as Whetmore Cave,
led to sharp divisions of opinion between the former members of this
Court about the correct application of Newgarth criminal law. Now we
find ourselves again with Whetmore Cave at the center of controversy, this
time in the context of environmental law and policy.
Since its discovery in the year 2000 A.D,. and for the past two millennia, the Poroxisis blarissium spore, known commercially as placidium,
has served to enhance our society in many fashions. Its molecular energy
and strange biological properties have provided a seemingly boundless
supply of clean and efficient power sources. Its various chemical applications have allowed us to avoid or reverse many environmental maladies
and to feed many impoverished peoples. With each instance of concern
over the relentless depletion of yet another natural resource, such as timber, coal, petroleum, metal ores, and potable fresh water, some application of placidium's miraculous qualities has provided a solution which
allowed our continued economic and social prosperity despite the continued loss of that resource.
Alas, placidium, with all its benefits, has also led to a complacency
that puts us in the quandary of this case. As a society we have. developed
highly advanced technologies that provide all our needs, with placidium
having served as both the source of technological advance and the solution to the pernicious side effects of technology such as pollution and reL
source depletion. But we have used placidium faster than it regenerates in
nature, and have found no way to reproduce it in the laboratory, or to
synthesize its molecular structure. Our skill in finding it, ingenuity in
transforming it, and dependence on using it have led to its near depletion
from the face of the planet. We find ourselves now having exhausted all
known sources of placidium except for what is found in Whetmore Cave.
We are thus faced with the decision of what to do with Whetmore Cave,
which very much involves the decision of what to do with society.
Unfortunately, the complacency of the last two millennia has also led
to an atrophy of legal processes for making such decisions. Because
placidium has made all other resource depletions and technological side
effects virtually irrelevant and costless to our society, or seemingly so, we
have had no occasion in the past two thousand years in which we were
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forced to allocate and balance competing environmental and social resources. We appear thus to have forgotten how to do so. It is incumbent
upon this Court, therefore, to strike a paradigm of environmental law and
policy for the future where none exists today.
I
The factual and procedural background ofthis case is not complicated, but leads to complicated issues.
A
The story of Roger Whetmore's demise is well known in Newgarth
and provides the genesis of this case. In May of 4299. he and fellow spelunkers entered the interior of a limestone cavern of the type found in the
Central Plateau of this commonwealth. The companions became entrapped inthe cave after a rockslide, and efforts to rescue them were severely hampered. Faced with imminent death, and over Whetmore's
advice against the plan but with his consent to participate, the group
agreed to draw lots to determine whose life would be taken to provide
nourishment for the others until rescuers could reach them. Whetmore
lost that lottery and his life, and the others eventually were rescued alive.
Following criminal proceedings and convictions against them, this Court,
in A divided opinion, upheld their sentences of death.
After their executions, the research notes of one of Whetmore's companions and killers, Grayson Grant, eventually found their way into the
hands of Glaxon Corporation, today the world's leading producer of
placidium spores and supplier of, placidium products. According to the
notes, Whetmore Cave, as it had come to be known, contains bountiful
supplies of placidium spores-enough to supply the world's needs for fifty
years. This discovery was considered by Glaxon, and by most of the
world, as quite fortunate, since Glaxon had announced in June of 4304 that
its proven reserves of placidium had dwindled to a twenty-year world supply, and no other producers were in operation. Glaxon had conducted an
exhaustive worldwide search for new -sources, and had found only the
promise of Whetmore Cave by the end of its effort.
Glaxon's discovery was considered quite fortunate-indeed, on the
order of a miracle-simply because of how dependent our world society
has become on placidium for all its essential needs. Placidium, discovered
by Glaxon's founder over two millennia ago, is an unusual biological agent
possessing unusual qualities. It can be harnessed for energy production in
amazing efficiencies. It can easily be chemically converted into a variety of
substances that provide,.among other things, the raw materials to synthetically produce sources of nutrition, building materials, clothing, medicines,
and potable water. It can be used to neutralize pollutants of all varieties,
allowing easy recycling of the toxic spent materials and byproducts associated with our highly, industrialized society.
Of course, these uses of placidium were not known immediately upon
its discovery. Rather, over the centuries Glaxon has advanced its research
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of placidium time and again to allow society to avoid environmental and
social disaster. For example, when in 2040 scientists conclusively showed
that the phenomenon then known as global warming would, within ten
years from that date, irreversibly destroy the earth's capacity to support
life, Glaxon discovered a process using chemicals derived from placidium
to reverse the effects. And as world supplies of timber and metal ores
dwindled to precariously low levels during the twenty-seventh century,.
Glaxon produced synthetic building materials using placidium derivatives
that surpassed all properties of wood and metals. And in 3010, when widespread fungal infestations destroyed the entire world's crops and seed
banks, Glaxon only weeks later developed a process based on placidium
to produce an abundant source of nutritious food.
Glaxon's record of pulling society from the breach has continued unblemished through the centuries. Indeed, for the past five centuries, despite the paucity of naturally, occurring timber, metal ores, potable fresh
water, coal, and petroleum, despite the difficulty of raising crops sufficient
to feed all nations' populations, and despite the frequent collapses of fish
stocks in our world oceans, our society has prospered to levels never
imagined at times when those resources were bountiful in nature, all because of placidium. For the past two hundred years, moreover, we have
been able to halt further exploitation of the planet's few remaining preserves of natural and biological resources, and have even made strides in
restoring stands of parkland and agricultural land to serve as places of
recreational and aesthetic enjoyment as well as scientific research. Only
continued supplies of placidium, however, make it easy for society to contain those precious areas from human need.
Hence, Glaxon's interest in. Whetmore Cave was understandable. The
company purchased the cave in 4305, and began to prepare it for
placidium extraction. Placidium is found only in subterranean limestone.
features. The placidium extraction process involves the repeated injection
of various gases into the cave space, which react with placidium spores to
make their location and extraction easier. The effect of the gases, however, is to kill all life forms in the cave and to render the cave uninhabitable for many years thereafter. (The placidium is removed by robotic
machines.) Additionally, the gases tend to permeate into the surrounding
subterranean water and soils, causing their long-term pollution. Of course,
placidium could be used to neutralize the pollution, but it is usually destined for other more cost-effective uses. Thus the area around placidium
mines generally is left to become a wasteland.
By May of the year 4306, Glaxon had made all the necessary preparations for instituting this process at Whetmore Cave, when the leading environmental group of Newgarth, Earth One, learned of the company's plans
and complained to the Environment Agency. Earth One revealed that it
had obtained the research notes of another of Roger Whetmore's companions, Lisa LeMaster, a biologist who had recorded an abundance of rare
species within the cave. Indeed, Earth One's further research had indicated that Whetmore Cave houses the last known specimens of over two
hundred different species of amphibians, invertebrates, snakes, fish, and

HeinOnline -- 27 Envtl. L. 346 1997

1997]

THE SPELUNCEAN POLLUTERS

bats. By all scientific accounts the cave's discovery was a virtual gold
mine of new biological information. Obviously, Glaxon's plans for
placidium extraction threatened the continued existence of those species.
After Earth One revealed its information, an organization known as
Justice! came forward also to. register its concerns about Glaxon's plans.
Justice! advocates a more equitable distribution of the benefits of our society, and has focused in many other settings on income disparities that
exist, Justice! alleges, because of racial, ethnic, and other prejudices of
society. In 4305, Justice! had issued a report correlating the locations of
Glaxon's placidium mines with high incidences of birth defects, cancer,
and other medical problems in the local populations. Moreover, alleged
the report, 'the local populations invariably consisted of low income, minority citizens. Justice! demanded to know what Glaxon would do to correct these alleged injustices and to prevent them from happening at
Whetmore Cave.
B
Notwithstanding the complaints of Earth One and Justice! outlined
above, Glaxon announced its plans to begin the placidium extraction process. In August 4306, Earth One and Justice! fied a petition with the Environment Agency requesting that the agency, enjoin Glaxon from
commencing its operations pending a full review of the situation by the
agency.
The Environment Agency is authorized to administer the Environment Act, which, besides the provisions establishing the agency and providing for its funding and operation, consists of just one substantive
provision stating, "[tihe Environment Agency is authorized to regulate all
matters affecting or involving the environment in the most appropriate
manner, using the most appropriate standards and criteria for such purposes." 15 N.S.C.A. (N.S.) § 5. This rather compassless legislative directive, adopted in this form in 4100, is representative of the modem
legislative practice of delegating power to administrative agencies in almost unbounded capacities. We have held in similar contexts, nevertheless, that by constraining the agency to the "most appropriate" manner of
regulation, the Newgarth Legislature has satisfied the constitutional requirement that when delegating power to agencies it provide "comprehensible principles" with which the agency can implement the statutory
directive, and courts may review the agency's action. See Larson v. Revenue Agency, 78 N.55th 7890 (4167).
At the time Earth One and Justice! lodged their petitions, however,
the Environment Agency had no regulations or policy for deciding
whether and how to license placidium mines, or any other form of mining
operation for that matter. Over the centuries of its placidium mining and
production, Glaxon has simply obtained approval from the agency for its
activities by general permit, and not since 2256 has any citizen requested
what Earth One and Justice! have requested the Environment Agency to
do with respect to Glaxon.
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Acting in this vacuum of regulatory licensing practice, the agency issued a temporary order enjoining Glaxon from proceeding with its operations and promptly thereafter convened a hearing in which Glaxon, Earth
One, and Justice! participated as full parties. The hearing spanned five
months, during which time the parties presented testimony and other evidence establishing the facts outlined above. Several weeks after the close
of the hearing, without providing a statement of its rationale, the Environment Agency rendered an order allowing Glaxon to proceed with the operations, but containing the following provisions and conditions: 1) Glaxon
must preserve one area of the cave, about one-quarter of its total volume
and containing one-third of the placidium deposits, and prevent any ill effects of the gases and other mining operations from affecting that portion;
2) Glaxon must pay compensation to all residents living within ten miles
of the surface opening of Whetmore Cave, to each in an amount sufficient
to allow either relocation out of the area to comparable housing, or longterm medical monitoring and care should a resident choose not to relocate; 3) Glaxon must finance the pre-extraction relocation of as many species individuals as possible from the injured portion of Whetmore Cave to
another cave that the Environment Agency shall select and Glaxon will
purchase and maintain in perpetuity; and 4) Glaxon must establish and
support an alternative energies and technologies research foundation to
be financed through a ten percent levy placed on Glaxon's gross revenues
from sales of placidium crystals that are taken from Whetmore Cave and
the products made therefrom.
All parties appealed from the Environment Agency order to the District Court for the Central District. The trial court, consistent with our
decision in Groton v. AgricultureDepartment, 100 N.60th 62 (4209), construed the amended Agency Procedure and Review Act, 3 N.S.C.A. (N.S.)
§ 42, to require that the court uphold the agency's action unless the court
could think of absolutely no rational basis therefor. Using that standard
the trial court found, after oral argument and review of the record evidence, that the agency had "struck a fair and rational balance of interests"
and thus its order should be upheld. On appeal by all parties, the Intermediate Court for the Third Circuit affirmed without opinion.
II
We are confronted in this case, in a way we have not been for over
two millennia, with the imminent possibility of a world without placidium.
Without placidium, we may have no way of meeting all the world's sustenance and sheltering needs. Without placidium, we may have no way of
avoiding the pernicious effects of industrialization on humans and the environment. Without placidium, in other words, we may find ourselves, between nations, within nations,.,, even amongst local communities,
competing fiercely for unthinkably limited resources and searching in vain
for measures to protect human health and the environment.
Our decision in this case, therefore, can take nothing for granted. We
are writing on what appears to be a clean slate to determine what, in the
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words' of our applicable environmental statute, is the "most appropriate"
approach for making difficult choices in a world of limited options.
Although this Court is new at the task, I find in this regard that the Environment Agency's decision indeed was consistent with what I believe
should be considered the "most appropriate" method of resolving environmental law and policy issues for the bleak picture of the future I have
unwillingly painted.
Placidium has lulled us into believing that we may be concerned with
only one side of a two-sided question that must be posed when confronted
by limited resources. That is, placidium has allowed us to present all
choices as having only benefits, and no costs or risks. If Glaxon is correct,
however, that the world's placidium supply will run dry in fifty years at
best, or thirty years under the Environment Agency's order, our choices
for the future will necessarily have to take into account the probability of
long-term costs and risks associated with every option. How will we know
what to do in that world? How will we decide which of many options is
the correct choice? Hidden within the Environment Agency's order I find
the answer-we must perfect the art of assessing the risks, and weighing
and balancing the costs and benefits of every option, so that we may regulate intelligently given our knowledge of needs and capabilities. When I
.conduct that analysis for the situation before this Court, I reach a decision
very close to the Environment Agency's regulatory order; therefore, I can
only conclude that the Environment Agency's order is sound.
A
Each decision we make about a resource use carries with it costs and
benefits at a macrosocial scale. Without giving it much conscious thought,
people constantly evaluate the probable risks and relative costs and benefits of many commonplace decisions, such as whether to indulge in a rich
meal or to exercise, or which home to purchase. These trade-off decisions
are made all the time at higher social levels as well, suchas in our decisions about tax and spending policies. Sound environmental policy requires that we develop a framework for making the same decisions about
resource uses, the regulation of toxins, the control of pollution sources,
and the like-that is, a method for 1) quantifying estimates of the costs
and benefits of alternative environmental policies, and 2) comparing the
resulting quantifications across the spectrum of policy alternatives.
To be sure, doing this at the level of society's environmental policy
will not be as easy as is the individual's choice of dining menu. There will
be uncertainty about any value number assigned to costs and benefits.
Seldom, for example, can we predict with absolute scientific confidence
the health risks posed by exposure to some newly formulated chemical.
The risk assessment process in such cases is an exercise in probability
undertaken in the midst of nagging uncertainty. Indeed, the threshold qualitative judgment about what are to be counted as costs and as benefits
may even be subject to debate. There will be effects, good or bad, for
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which quantification in dollar terms may seem irrational or unethical. For
example, how valuable is a sunset?
But these measurement problems and issues of uncertainty, as insurmountable as they may seem, would be inherent in any rational decisionmaking process for environmental policy we might devise. To acknowledge that we will never establish with absolute precision a quantifiable
value of all the consequences of a proposed action is not to render the
effort to do so pointless. We may not know all, but we know much about
measuring costs and benefits in terms of the medium that is the most common and fungible known to us-money. We enjoy a highly refined understanding of biophysical consequences, of technological costs, 'of
physiological responses, of statistical estimation techniques, of consumer
preferences, and of the monetary values attached to them. Computer models of breathtaking power and speed allow us to model and predict the
behavior of extremely complex systems. It would be folly to ignore the
body of information that would be produced by the concerted, rigorous,
and objective application of these tools of analysis to environmental policy decisions. Indeed, our failure to employ these means of policy analysis
for the past two thousand years is what has led us to this precarious point.
B
Having concluded that the science of assessing risk and quantifying
and comparing the relative costs and benefits of environmental policy alternatives is a prudent framework for making the resource use decisions
of our future, we must return to the question, of how the Environment
Agency must implement that approach. Clearly, for this method to provide
any decision-making value, the technical analyses must be free of professional and political bias. We must be sure that our decisions are based on
"good" science in the objective sense, not the subjective sense. Hence, as a
threshold matter, it is incumbent on the agency to establish a framework
and apparatus to conduct the requisite nonnormative, apolitical analysis
according to accepted scientific methods.
The information produced by that arm of the agency, however, ultimately must be qualified and considered according to the level of uncertainty inherent in the process and by the complications of close policy
calls. Some decisions will be easy, such as when one alternative course of
action unquestionably presents vast benefits and few costs. But as this
case illustrates, it will not always be so. One can foresee a situation, for
example, in which the predicted benefits of one alternative are very large,
but only narrowly outweigh the costs, whereas the costs of another alternative outweigh the benefits, but both the costs and benefits in the latter
case are minuscule. Would it be better for society to choose the former
alternative because its benefits outweigh the costs? No one can say ahead
of time. If the degree of uncertainty is'large in the cost-benefit quantifications, it may be foolish. to pick the first alternative and risk the possibility
that the quantification of benefits was overestimated and of cost was underestimated. Indeed, even if the risk of quantification error was small, as
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a matter of policy it may be undesirable to inflict large costs on society
simply to gain marginally higher benefits. Ultimately; therefore, it is also
incumbent onthe agency to integrate the information derived from the
norm-free quantification process into a decision-making framework that
produces consistently sound policies.
The agency can accomplish these twin tasks only if we abide by the
spirit of the Environment Act's broad delegation of regulatory authority to
the agency and of the deference to agency decisions required of the courts
under the Agency Procedure and Review Act. The courts must ensure that
the risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis procedures are faithfully followed, and that. the agency does not so depart from the most favorable
predicted quantitative outcome among its policy choices-say, by choosing an alternative with costs significantly exceeding benefits, or failing to
provide sound reasons for rejecting the most favorable cost-benefit alternative-as to be unreasonable. Beyond those questions the courts should
not venture.
III
Having outlined the proper criterion and method for making our future environmental policy choices, we must exercise the judicial review,
function just discussed. Here, it is manifest that the Environment Agency
considered a spectrum of options for dealing with the incompatible
desires of Glaxon, Earth, One, and Justice! as they represent competing
options for how society as a whole might choose. Although the agency did
not explicitly state its criterion for weighing each alternative, it is sufficiently apparent from the agency's order that risk assessment and costbenefit analysis are inherent in the approach. The agency has, in effect,
asked society to sacrifice twenty years of placidium in order to preserve
the last known pristine environment on the planet, a trade-off that this
Court is in no position to criticize. The mitigation measures imposed by
the agency on Glaxon reflect a careful evaluation of the risks and consequences of the mining activity, as well as a balancing of costs and benefits
felt by Glaxon, the environment, and the local residents. Indeed, with foresight the agency has asked Glaxon, in return for the privilege of mining the
placidium, to finance research that will invest in our means of managing
society's new and vastly more difficult future. Hence,- although in subsequent cases the courts would be justified in asking more of the agency in
terms of quantitative justification in the record for its policy decisions, I.
find no basis for concluding that a sound, rigorous cost-benefit analysis in
this case would not have adequately supported the agency's decision.
In this regard, I am puzzled by the concerns and criticisms expressed
by other Justices-all those, that is, except Justice Choonbrad, whose
concerns with legislative delegation of power cause him to offer no solution at all-with respect to the agency's decision and my rationale for endorsing it. Justice Coasela, for example, objects that the agency has not
produced a result we could expect to emanate from her conception of the
so-called economic free market. To be sure, the market' is an important
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source of quantitative information relevant to the cost-benefit analysis I
endorse. However, the market alone cannot be relied upon to produce
consistently sound policy decisions. If any social institution is susceptible
to uncertainty and imperfect information, it is the market. Uncertainty
about health risks might trigger precautionary responses in social policy
that would not be produced through purely market forces. Quite simply,
the market cannot be relied upon as the exclusive method of cost-benefit
valuation, for many environmental amenities simply have no readily ascertainable marketable value. For example, collective goods, such as the air,
cannot be traded in the market. Nor can the intrinsic value of, say, an
endangered songbird readily be translated into values relevant to the market. The market is an important quantification tool, but is clumsy in some
important applications of environmental policy decision making.
On the opposite side of the table is Justice Brandtlund, who objects
that both the market and my cost-benefit method are too shortsighted to
produce a sustainable society after placidium runs out. I confess that
placidium has led our society to lose sight of the ecosystem dynamics that
play a central role in Justice Brandtlund's conception of our policy future,
but there is no reason that a fully equipped and rationally applied risk
assessment and cost-benefit method cannot integrate ecological sustainability as a goal and plan for the long run in that regard. To make that
our exclusive goal, however, would be to ignore the fruits of the information our risk assessment and cost-benefit analyses produce regarding
other important social values.
Justices Ephsteid and Gaialis take the "free market" and "sustainable
ecosystem" criteria, respectively, to mystical extremes. Justice -Ephsteid
wishes that environmental policy be constrained by notions of raw private
property rights not recognized since ancient times, and would eviscerate
government's role in policy choices to that of a bystander. Justice Gaialis,
at the opposite extreme, would subjugate all social policy to an amorphous, quasi-religious environmental "ethic;" and would install an envirostate to ensure we all worship in unison. I am confident that either of their
approaches would consistently produce wide departures from rational
policy results, and would give rise to ineffective and unmanageable institutions of government. In any event, to the extent members of society share
the profoundly personal beliefs expressed by either of the two Justices, a
well-designed cost-benefit analysis will reflect the' breadth and depth of
their value preferences through preference survey techniques that assist in
quantifying nonmarketable values of that sort
Finally, Justice Billarck presents a sweeping condemnation of the rest
of the Court as amounting to mere pawns in a broader social policy of
racial and economic oppression manifested, among other ways, through
environmental policy. Yet the distributive justice concerns he expresses
can easily be integrated into the framework I advocate. Indeed, I can conceive of no better way of exposing the social injustices that motivate Justice Billarck than to engage in the rigorous assessment of risks and
quantification of costs and benefits underlying our policy alternatives, al-
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beit with a careful eye towards how the population-wide risks and aggre-gate social costs and benefits are meted out to various discrete subgroups.
In sum, risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis, applied as I have
outlined, are the foundations of the only policy choice method which can
bring to life all of the various and disparate concerns expressed by the
other Justices, in a fully integrated manner that will allow reasoned, informed policy decisions. For those reasons, and because I find that the
Environment Agency's order adequately reflects the outcome of such a
method in the case of Glaxon's proposed mining operation, I would affirm
in all respects the lower court's decision upholding the agency order.
MR.JUSTcE COASELA, with whom Ms. JUsTcE SIMONE joins, delivered
the following opinion.
If the sages were to be believed, the world would have ended countless times by now. Almost annually for as long as history has been recorded we have heard dire prognoses of the end of the environment. Of
course, none of the doomsayers has borne true. Before placidium, other
technological advances rendered those predictions nonsensical every time
bar none. Since placidium's discovery, its remarkable qualities have
played the major role in that continuing tale. What will happen now that
placidium appears sure to run out? The answer is right before our noses:
the same forces that led to technological advances in ancient times, and
the same forces that led to the proliferation of placidium's uses, will
emerge again to lead us to the solution. Fortunately, we need invest nothing to tap into those forces, we need not search them out, we need not
create government bureaucracies to make them work in our favor, for
they are the forces of the most time-tested institution of resource allocation ever devised-the market.
When left to operate freely, the simple laws of supply and demand,
profit seeking, and marginal returns will work tirelessly, and at no cost to
society, to organize socioeconomic behavior in ways that solve problems
of resource scarcity and depletion with flawless efficiency. For two millennia we have avoided problems of the environment precisely because
the mining, manufacture, distribution, and use of placidium have been
orchestrated not by some bureaucrat toting up Chief Justice Cosben's
ethereal costs and benefits, but by the largely invisible, highly decentralized, always efficient marketplace. When crops were devastated by worldwide fungal invasions, society's undiminished demand, for food vastly
outstripped the supply. The profit motive, not political will, focused the
energy of technological innovation on meeting that demand, and new technologies using placidium were born. Perhaps placidium has atrophied our
sensitivity to resource scarcity, but it has not done the same to the market,
which, fortunately, continues to enjoy a central role in our otherwise
highly regulated society. If we turn to that institution as we have countless
times before, I am confident that the demise of placidium supplies will not
spell the demise of civilization.
I must acknowledge, however, that it is possible there will not be new
substitute technologies for all of placidium's uses discovered in time to
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avoid social dislocation at some scale. Environmental despoliation and
degradation thus may return to haunt us as very real possibilities in some
contexts. Yet problems of the environment are no more than problems of
the market. In other words, when obstacles confront free exercise of the
market, among the consequences may be pollution, overexploitation of resources, and other economic maladaptations leading to environmental
degradation and threats to human health. We do not need to reexamine
our morals to solve such problems, but rather need simply to keep track of
the overarching goal of maximizing social utility through the free market.
When that goal is met, everything else falls into its proper place.
To work effectively asa tool of policy making that will overcome obstacles to that goal, the market requires several conditions which are not
always present in society, particularly a -society in which the government
has worked assiduously, albeit with good intentions, to regulate social
conditions in ways that pose barriers to freedom of economic pursuits.
First, the goods and services traded in the market must be as close as
possible to fully defined and enforceable individual property rights. ,When
those rights are amorphous or undefined, such as with goods held in common, valuation and trading in the market are complicated. Second, the
persons trading in the market must have as near to perfect information
about the goods and services being traded as possible, so that their individually hedonistic decisions designed to maximize utility can be rationally made. Finally, there must not be significant barriers to the trading
action of the market, lest the transactions cost to individual traders become so high as to prevent themfrom trading when they otherwise would.
These conditions are the watchguards of economic efficiency in the market, and thus of rational environmental policy as well.
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of how environmental problems
would arise were these conditions consistently met. No individual owning
a resource would allow it to be depleted or wasted in an economically
irrational manner, hence, the problems of overexploitation of commonly
owned goods would not emerge. And .nomanufacturer could ignore the
pollution consequences of the production of goods and thus overproduce,
as the owners of the injured property would seek damages and simply
return the costs of pollution to the polluter, who would curtail production
in response. Moreover, after that market adjustment was made, if the owners of the injured property valued the pristine state of their property more
than the manufacturer valued production of the goods, they would simply
pay the manufacturer to reduce production (or invest more in pollution
control) until an equilibrium satisfactory to all concerned was reached.
This is the market .in efficient operation, and there is no reason why it
cannot work on behalf of the environment in these ways.
Seen from this perspective, one must agree that pollution is not an
immoral act, but rather an economically rational response made in the
context of an imperfectly designed market. Accordingly, it is incumbent
on the Environment Agency not to interfere with the market as a tool of
environmental policy, but rather to facilitate the conditions just discussed.
For example, where goods are difficult to reduce to *private property
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rights, such 'as is the case with air, the agency can act to simulate that
market condition, perhaps by auctioning air pollution rights. And the
agency must work tirelessly to provide information about environmental
conditions to the public, so that relevant data may be integrated into all
persons' market decisions. Finally, the agency must provide an open, accessible forum for the bargaining that must occur for market forces to
shape environmental behavior, perhaps by providing nuisance remedies
and by facilitating community organizations. The last thing the agency
should do, however, is to let the hysteria associated with the now finite
supply of placidium prompt it to displace the market in the name of the
environment.
It is appalling to me, therefore, that other members of this Court
would stifle or altogether abandon the market for their various concoctions of'policy making. The Chief Justice claims that her program of converting meticulously calibrated risk assessment and cost-benefit analyses
into regulatory decrees has the valuation mechanism of the market at its
core, but one assuredly will never see that deep through the layers of bureaucracy and dense regulatory script that are certain to envelop and
smother the dynamic forces of the market. I shudder to think of the manipulations of reality the cadres of scientists and economists will carry out
to estimate. risks and invent shadow-like values for items for which they
deem the market has not adequately accounted. The regulatory abuse of
the market that will follow as those fictions are translated into policy decisions will impose tremendous dislocations of rational economic behavior.
And the carrying cost to society of the cost-benefit evaluation process and
its regulatory implementation will not be insignificant. The beauty of the
market is that it requires no centralized government infrastructure to identify, weigh, and compare costs and benefits. The market works for free,
values only that which has value, does so accurately and efficiently, and
needs no one to operate it.
Justices Branatlund and Gaialis, whose outlines of centrally planned
enviro-economies differ only in matter of degree, would steer the market
right.out of existence. Justice Brandtlund's vision of sustainable development overlooks the fact that, through the free market, society has sustained a vibrant economy and healthful standard of living for thousands of
years. He offers no convincing reason for eschewing that tradition, or for
believing that the Environment Agency can devise a master plan that will
work better for as -long as the market has. Justice Gaalis is at least open
about her desire to drop all pretense of fostering economic well-being,
placing environmental preservation in an exalted position of policy dominance. She is less than open, notwithstanding her lip service to a new age
of local authority, about the inevitable reality that her approach would
mean giving carte blanche to the Environment Agency to plan all facets of
our lives: birth control, diet, clothing materials, consumer choices, work
habits, energy use, housing, recreation. No aspect of our day-to-day living
could be left to anything less than total predesign by an omnipotent central authority. The problem is that.in politics, omnipotence without omnis-
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cience is a recipe for totalitarianism. Even with placidium running out, I
do not think we are ready for that yet.
Although I share Justice Ephsteid's reverence for private property as
an organizing principle for environmental policy, I cannot subscribe to her
demand for the exit of government as an essential feature of that prescription. To be sure, fully defined and enforceable private property rights are a
necessary component of a fully operative market system, and government
intervention in the market can spell disaster in that regard. However, Justice Ephsteid appears to believe both that government is the market's only
enemy and that government can be an enemy only. History has shown,
however, that prudent, restrained, well-planned government action can
close imperfections in the market, such as poorly defined property rights
and inadequate dissemination of market information, and that without
such limited intervention some private market participants may prey on
market imperfections to their unfair advantage. Hence, by no means do I
believe that adopting a market-based approach to environmental policy is
tantamount to issuing a pink slip to the government.
Lastly, when one peels away the surface of his diatribe on environmental equity, Justice Billarck weighs in with a theme that does not appear to be predisposed to any view of environmental policy so much as it
is motivated by his unstated anathema for the market-based approach I
advocate. It is true that the market itself is blind to income, race, and
ethnicity, and thus doles out its rewards without an eye to those factors of
social importance. It is inevitable, moreover, that not everyone will fare
equally in the market. Justice Billarck's concern with these conditions is
that, as it appears to him, persons of low income, minority race, or minority ethnicity are too often at the end of the receiving line in the market,
and that this general phenomenon has manifested itself in ways including
exposure to disproportionately degraded environmental conditions.
Even if this state of affairs is true as a statistical matter, it is not the
fault of the market, nor is the solution to eviscerate the market as a means
of overcoming social prejudices that are the root cause of the problem if
there is one. The market will not prevent a racist from acting in an economically irrational manner; however, the solution is to get rid of racism,
not to get rid of the market.. We do so through civil rights laws, public
education, and, most important, through consumer pressure in the market.,
The market also cannot be responsible for prejudicial government policies
that, in Justice Billarck's view, promote environmental inequity. Thus,
tinkering with the market cannot provide the solution there either. We address those sources of state-imposed disparity, if they exist, by vigilantly
maintaining open and democratic political institutions. At least with the
market in place and government operating transparently, we will know
that any resulting disparities of environmental conditions are borne of real
differences in ability, not by prejudicially driven differences in opportunity. In the end, however, not every square inch of our nation can be maintained to the same level of environmental quality. To the extent consumers
value higher environmental quality settings, it is inevitable that those with
more resources will locate in the areas with the better environmental sur-
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roundings. To construct an environmental policy that precludes that result
would require nothing less than dismantling our market system.
With the foregoing in mind, I am led to find certain aspects of the
Environment Agency's order in Glaxon's case troubling. Clearly, the
agency's intervention in the case was unprecedented in the history of
placidium mining, signaling a departure. from what heretofore has been
mostly a market-driven industry. We know that the market for placidium
would support Glaxon mining the cave for the full fifty-year supply of ore,
and that Glaxon owns the whole cave and everything in it. Neither Earth
One nor the Environment Agency offered to buy out Glaxon's interest in
the one-quarter of the cave the agency has ordered to be set aside, or to
finance relocation of the species in the remainder of the cave, and thus I
would strike those requirements as failing to reflect a fair market outcome
for Glaxon. The ten percent levy on Glaxon appears to be a way for the
agency to blackmail Glaxon into financing public research on placidium
substitutes, whereas it is by no means Glaxon's fault that such research is
needed. As it is highly probable that Glaxon or others in a free-market
atmosphere would engage in such research simply as a consequence of
their profit motives, I would strike that condition of the order as well. By
contrast, it is plausible that the relocation and. medical monitoring payments the agency has ordered Glaxon to make to local residents is a way
of simulating damages remedies that force Glaxon to account for the full
costs of its pollution-causing actions. Although I Would prefer to have had
that matter settled through an evidentiary hearing focusing on the cause
and effect of proven injuries to the residents, I am content to let that portion of the order stand. Overall, therefore, the agency's order is a far cry
from where one would reasonably expect the market to lead us for the
future, and I can only hope that the Environment Agency and this Court
soon rediscover the merits of that institution before the shortage of
placidium presents very real. and, perhaps, irreversible suffering.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDTLUND, with whom Ms. JUSTICE PREKAUSIAN joins,
delivered the foUowing opinion.
Placidium has bought us time, but time is up. We are now faced with
what was an inevitable realization-that our planet must be treated as a
closed system, the sustainability of which depends on our every action.
We have delayed this day for over two millennia through the panacea of
placidium, and in the process have engaged in actions of such tremendously shortsighted vision that we now must ask in all seriousness
whether the next generation will survive. How this has come to be is no
mystery, or should not be to anyone who pauses even for a moment to
consider what the so-called wonder of placidium has meant for the
environment.
Simply put, placidium has driven a wedge between the human condition and the natural environment surrounding us. We have replaced the
environment with placidium as the barometer of our quality of life, thus
opening the door to technology's perverse, insidious erosion of the environment. Placidium has been trumpeted as always saving the day: a
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source of food when crops are ravaged, a means of neutralizing pollution
from some new manufacturing process, a source of building materials to
substitute for wood and metal. Yet in so doing, placidium has completely
warped our conception of what the environment is here to do. With
placidium, we have come to view the environment as a fungible raw input
for our highly industrialized society like just ' another chunk of metal.
Viewed that way, why would we not base resource use, pollution control,
and other environmental policy decisions on the short-term consequences? After all, when one ore, or a source of water, or a source of
energy, or some other natural resource runs out, and-when humans and
the environment are exposed to new toxins and pollutants, we can turn to
placidium to "save the day" and allow us to pass our seemingly limitless,
risk-free quality of life along to our progeny. But having lulled us into this
false sense of timeless security, placidium now emerges as the grim
reaper. If we have no placidium to give to our progeny, what will we give.
them? At our current pace of consumption, within a generation we will
have no crops, no ores, no timber, no potable water, no 'fish to consumewe will have nothing, nothing to show for two millennia of so-called
progress.
We have no choice but to radically alter our conception of resource
management and environmental protection if we are to have any hope that
it is not too late. We must accept responsibility as the stewards of our
planet and all its natural and biological richness. We must accept responsibility for giving future generations the same or a better chance to steward
that diverse environment. We must accept responsibility as being part of
the interconnectedness of every ecosystem-from as big as an ocean to as
small as a puddle-that makes up what we call our planet. Truly, however,
even with the benefit of placidium we know very little about how to bear
these responsibilities. This is why every decision we make henceforth
must be made with extreme caution, with care for what consequences to
human health and the environment might be ten, one hundred, even one
thousand years hence, and with care for the dynamic complexity of the
ecosystems affected by our every move. We must appreciate. that what
appears to us as. even the smallest of mistakes today may turn into an
environmental disaster in a decade, and we will have no placidium left to
save the day. Stewardship for sustainability thus must be the Environment
Agency's guiding principle in all that it does, and we should fill the
agency's toolbox with every device imaginable to let it fulfill that mission.
If it takes telling consumers they can no longer use environmentally damaging products, or restricting a property owner's destruction of precious
resources, or charging fees to manufacturers for their pollution, then so be
it.
Of course, the sustainability I imagine is one also of economic prosperity. We should not lose track of the objective here-to continue, even,
to improve upon, the quality of life as a whole. We must have a growing
economy that provides equitable opportunities for a safe and secure life
for current and future generations. I -suspect that history would show that
the poorest nations economically have also had the poorest environmental
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protection records, as abject poverty seldom leads citizens to support
,strong environmental policies or allows government to afford such a program. A robust economy helps to counter those effects, thus accruing benefits to the environment as an indirect result of improving the human
economic condition. Hence, whereas the goals of protecting the environment and promoting economic and social development often have been
portrayed as incompatible, they are in fact mutually reinforcing.
We also must not subjugate basic civil liberties to some notion of a
higher socio-environmental purpose. Government must preserve fundamental human rights to shelter, food, and land as the base means of sustenance, and must act in partnership, with private interests, rather than as
their enemy. A strong regulatory arm is needed to set the course, but our
fundamental democratic ideals must not be cast adrift.
Thus stewardship and sustainability are questions of balance, but of
balance for the long term, not the short term, and of balance reached with
great caution for its dynamic fragility, not with haste and risk for what we
gamble of it today. The world we hand to our progeny must be one.in
which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, and the
orientation of technological development and institutional change are all
in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human
needs and aspirations.
I am saddened that I find no sense of this balanced stewardship in my
fellow Justices' outlines of environmental policy for the future. Chief Justice Cosben's utilitarian approach, it seems to me, places too much emphasis on sterile assessments of risk and macroanalyses of costs and
benefits. While these are important tools of environmental policy, their
reliability decreases as the scope of analysis moves outward on the time
line. When I speak of a sustainable balance of environment and economy, I
mean for perpetuity. The results of risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis are useful to that purpose only if we craft an overarching policy framework that is sufficiently flexible, adaptive, and integrative to shape
decisions in the midst of uncertainty, with the understanding that we may
need to buy precautionary insurance against future health and environmental calamities by putting aside the cost-benefit data from time to time.
At least Chief Justice Cosben recognizes the need to consider intergenerational contexts in her approach, which is more than can be said
for Justice Coasela. His belief that the market is our way out of the
placidium shortage thoroughly misses the gravity of the predicament in
which we have put ourselves. For the past two millennia the market has
worked relentlessly every step of the way towards our current condition.
Each time an issue of resource scarcity has been presented, the market
has led us to act economically rationally, as Justice Coasela would put it,
but environmentally suicidal. If placidium allowed the last tree to be cut
down for a profit, or the last river to be polluted without economic loss,
we would do so without regard to whether that decision would make life
physically, economically, or environmentally more difficult for a future
generation. True, we haven't had to pay forthe market to operate, but we
will pay for the consequences of its operation. How many of us will be
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comforted, when the last gasp of fresh air on the planet is inhaled, to
know that we preserved the market instead of our health and
environment? As for Justice Ephsteid, the folly of her primitive conception of property and law is self-evident. What, besides sheer ignorance, would lead
anyone to believe that in a constantly changing social and physical world,
where only adaptive, evolving. systems are sustainable, the institutions of
private property and federalist government structure must remain fixed in
the positions in which they were found in ancient times? Far from being a
static principle of Justice Ephsteid's fictional natural law, the legal dimensions of private property have always been created by, subservient to, and
evolving with the public good as regulated by the state. There is not a
single facet of our society or our environment that even resembles its condition of a thousand years ago, yet Justice Ephsteid clings to these vestiges of bygone eras as some form of immovable life forces without which
we will perish. I posit that the opposite is true-that the entrenchment of
broad private property rights and their immunity from reasonable government planning and regulation is the quickest way to worsen our condition
that anyone could devise. What incentive will property owners such as
Glaxon have in that world to give even the slightest consideration to the
environmental consequences of their actions, much less how those consequences might play out in future generations?
To be fair, I can understand why so many in our society share Justice
Ephsteid's views when I listen to Justice Gaialis's mantra-like invocation
of her deeply ecological values. The only way we could fulfill her vision of
a monolithic environmental ethic is to be positively unethical to humans,
and that is not part of a sustainable society in my view. Granted, we may
need to take many measures that place the environment at the forefront of
policy at the expense of property, and our consumer and reproductive behavior will have to yield to the long-term goals we set. It will take a concerted regulatory framework to be able to reshape society towards those
ends, but that program must be carried out in the context of the democratic political institutions and with respect for civil liberties that make
our society as rich as does our environment. Humans are not the only
concern for sustainable development, but they must be at the center.
Indeed, Justice Billarck and I seem to be closest in this regard, as I
share with him a cbncern for the equity of our environmental policies. But
I cannot share his intensity of focus on the elimination of any and all disparities as our central policy goal. We must all recognize that we are soon
entering an era of intense scarcity of resources. Sacrifice and suffering
unimaginable in our placidium days will become commonplace, and our
standard of living on average will plummet. Although we cannot countenance inequity borne of prejudice in that regard, we will have to be prepared for a lowering of expectations for all. I do not look forward to that
world, but I prefer it to no world at all.
Accordingly, albeit for reasons much different than my fellow Justices, I would affirm the Environment Agency's order in all respects. With
basic human welfare in mind, the agency has established a thirty-year we-
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aning period to get us off of the placidium habit, which should be ample
transition time to install a policy framework for sustainable development
in postplacidium society. The agency's decision to reserve part of the cave
for its pristine ecological conditions and as a §afe harbor for all of the
cave's species, on the other hand, ensures that we will have the benefit of
that ecological treasure for perpetuity. Although that resource may not
have useful value to us today, no one, can say that one of the creatures
living within or moved to the preserved cave space will not hold the solution to some future disease or other challenge we will face when
placidium runs dry. Placidium, after all, was just another spore until its
uses were discovered. Why should Glaxon have the right unilaterally to
snuff out those species simply because our legal system recognizes a property interest in the cave? Indeed, it is also fitting, given that Glaxon wishes
to exploit the last of placidium, to require Glaxon to help society plan for
the future through the research funding required by the agency's order.
Last, the agency wisely has considered the rights of the local residents,
finding that the need to mine the placidium for society's sake imposes a
social duty to ensure the well-being of the residents. Society will spread
that cost to the greater number When Glaxon passes on its relocation and
medical monitoring costs through its prices for placidium. Overall, none of
these measures deprives Glaxon of a profitable venture; combined, however, they offer a vision of the sort of balanced long term vision of sustainable development I can only hope we adopt as a general rule for our future
environmental policy.
Ms. JUSTICE EPHSTEiD delivered the following opinion.
In fifty years, thirty if the Environment Agency has its way, the world
will no longer be a friendly place in which to live. When that day comes, I
suspect that regardless of what this Court or the Environment Agency
does today, society will rediscover two simple principles that guided the
birth of democracy in ancient times: property rights and limited government. Each of the other Justices is deluded in thinldng that their respective policy frameworks actually will avoid or solve the resource crisis that
awaits us. My concern is focused more directly on the form of society we
will need in order to maintain civil liberty and democracy, without which
abundant resources and pristine environmental settings are worth very little to the human condition.
History will yield few examples of democratic societies that were not
based on strong enforcement of private property rights. The free ability to
acquire, use, and transfer property, and the ability to have government
there to protect those rights and do little else, has been an essential condition before any society has fulfilled its democratic aspirations. These conditions are thus derived from natural law, not as gratuities from the state. I
am unconvinced, therefore, that the environmental woes of postplacidium
society will be ameliorated by replacing the natural institution of private
property with the public property mentality of an enviro-state.
Indeed, very few of the resource losses to which the other Justices
point as evidence of placidium's lethal effect on society can be blamed on
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the institution of private property. Rather, the public sector and environmentalist organizations simply failed to act with regard to the environment
as if they had a proprietary interest in it. Before the last forests of the
Western Hemisphere were removed for timber, did any governmental entity or environmental group offer to purchase the lands so as to put them
to other uses, such as preservation or managed development? No. Iistead,
gradually but unmistakably, and at the relentless prodding of the elitist
preservationist intelligentsia, government has eroded private property
rights through countless measures of environmental regulation, to the
.point at which the government and environmental preservation groups
can have their candy for free, with no regard for the constitutional requirement of compensation for public appropriation of private property. NEW
CONST. art. IV, § 2. Although many deny that the so-called public good
has thus overexploited private property, this death by a thousand nicks at
the hands of regulatory sloth and self-indulgence has rendered private
property almost unrecognizable compared to its original form. But it is not
altogether lost. What remains of private property should, in my opinion, be
returned in full to its owners, unshackled from its regulatory chains, so
that the, owners can manage their resources according to private, democratically instilled interests.
It is not as if the Environment Agency would have no purpose under
that program. Government must provide a forum for protection of private
property, such as through nuisance claims, and protection against threats
to the public health, as is possible if toxic wastes are not properly handied. And the government must manage its own affairs and our relations
with other nations. All of those functions require public governmental infrastructure, but they do not require the regulatory behemoth into which
our state has grown. Hence, in the absence of-a nuisance or public health
threat, public law is not required to address environmental issues and
should not venture there. If it does, it should pay its way. And even when
regulation is carefully tailored to respond to nuisance or health issues, the
exactions and restrictions it imposes must be proportional to the problem
it addresses, or else, again, it must pay for the excess. These are not undue
demands on government, even with-indeed, especially with-placidium
running out.
Sadly, the other Justices on the Court appear so addicted to the administrative state they cannot conceive of a future without yet more governmental intervention in the lives of citizens under the flag of
environmental crisis. Chief Justice Cosben's cost-benefit state is but the
paradigm of a centralized bureaucracy with unlimited regulatory power to
micromanage property interests. Her approach will not get us off the road
we have been traveling-the road that has led us to this juncture.
Although I applaud Justice Coasela's vision of a free market, his tolerance
for government intervention to "correct" what we decide are "imperfections" in the free market is little more than a disguised love affair with
administrative power. Both of these approaches, I am sure, have a certain
appeal to persons who have blind faith that government will act reasonably, yet history has shown that the public appetite for private property is
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unquenchable. Private property is the creation neither of the government
nor of the market; it is synonymous with law itself and is a natural prerequisite to any true legal order.
As for Justices Brandtlund and Gaialis, -it is their antidemocratic
premises that chill my veins. Justice Brandtlund would have present generations order their affairs for the benefit of unnamed, unborn future individuals. Paradoxically, if we were to change present behavior with future
individuals in mind, we would alter the course of time and thus produce
entirely different individuals. In his view, to whom do we owe our duty,
the first set of possible individuals or the other? In any event, the further
evolution towards a centralized state implicit within Justice Brandtlund's
view, perhaps to one of even global proportions, would be inescapable
under his sustainable development vision. And although Justice Gaialis
claims her environmental ethics police will operate at the local level, it is
really a new world religion she has in mind. I am content, however, with
the Judeo-Christian ethic our state has used as its guiding light for millennia, as it is closely associated with respect for the private property rights
and' individualism necessary for fully empowered democracy.
Although his concern is with empowerment as well, Justice Billarck, I
am afraid, seems not to have understood the issue in this case. Most of the
conditions that motivate Justice Billarck's opinion, I believe, are associated with the erosion of democratic institutions in society as a result of
burgeoning governmental intervention in day to day life. To the extent environmental inequities might be present, therefore, they are simply manifestations of the inept regulatory state engaged in misguided social
engineering. These inequities will correct themselves when principles of
private property and limited government are restored as the foundations
of our social institutions. But the issue in this case is simply one of which
resource management framework to adopt, a question to which private
property and limited government are well suited in response, but for
which. Justice Billarck's social equity design seems inapposite. We will
.I
have to wait for another case to hash out his distributional ideals.
Based on these considerations, therefore, I would overrule the Environment Agency's order in all respects as addressing matters that are simply outside its scope of jurisdiction. As a threshold matter, what Glaxon
has planned has not been proven to pose a nuisance to any other property
owner, or a public health threat in general, and thus is a matter purely
within the exercise of its private property rights. In the absence of clear
and express delegation by the Legislature, I am not convinced the Environment Act authorizes the Environment Agency to act in that context, and
thus Glaxon should not need the approval of the Environment Agency to
mine any placidium.
Even assuming, however, that the Environment Act gives the agency
legal authority to restrict the mining in the absence of proof of a nuisance
or health threat, which the majority of the Court appears impliedly to conclude, unless the Environment Agency is prepared to compensate Glaxon
fully for the value of any placidium placed off limits to Glaxon, the.
agency's authority cannot be constitutionally exercised. No element of the
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agency's order satisfies this basic legal principle: the cave set aside and
species relocation orders intrude on Glaxon's interests without compensation, the award to local residents is not based on any finding of nuisance,
and the research funding tax is a bald exaction with noproportionality to
any transgression by Glaxon. The decision of the Intermediate Court
should, therefore, be reversed in so far as it restricts Glaxon from mining
any of the placidium by direct prohibition or unreasonable conditions.
Ms. JUSTICE GAIALis delivered the following opinion.
Thanks to placidium, when it comes to questions of the environment,
we have lost our ethical and spiritual'compass, and now we may lose our
very existence. I am no less than ridiculed by the other Justices of this
Court for even suggesting that there are ethical and spiritual dimensions
to environmental policy that should guide our legal decision today, but it
is they who, by writing environmental ethics out of the picture, worship
false gods. Whether it is cost-benefit science, or the market, or property
rights, or sustainable development, or social equity, each Justice has his or
her pet rationalist program for environmental policy, and each has forgotten that rationalism does not set the bounds and limits of the environment.
Therefore, not only are their respective starting points misguided, but so
too are their very world views.
I am not out of touch with our practical task at hand-to decide a
question of legal policy for management of the environment. But we confront questions of environmental law because we perceive problems of
environmental degradation. What causes those problems? Simply, the production and consumption patterns of our society, which in turn are shaped
by broad sociological and demographic factors such as population, technology, economy, and politics. Our social structure defines the fabric of
those conditions, but ultimately that social structure is shaped by the
deeply rooted ethics of the society. Any law that is out of touch with those
ethical foundations is doomed to failure, hence our question today is as
much one of ethics as it is of law. More accurately, we are confronted by
the need to rediscover our ethics of the environment, for placidium has
allowed us for two millennia to dispense with the need to have any such
ethics whatsoever.
I appreciate that no one likes to hear that their ethics are lacking in
essential respects, and thus I am not surprised to find defensiveness in
other members of the Court. But we have no luxury of clinging to rationalistic creeds of the past. Few would deny that, at our core, we are creatures
of ethics, so why does anyone deny that we are also creatures of the environment in need of an ethical world view consistent with that reality?
Even when placidium was abundant, there was no debate that we owed an
ethical duty directly to each other-a duty that required us to avoid threatening human welfare through environmental harms. That is why we took
full advantage of placidium-to reduce or, often, eliminate the detrimental
environmental effects of our behavior. I presume that this ethical premise
will not perish, but could it be a workable premise for postplacidium soci-
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ety to deny that we also owe ethical duties directly to the environment? I
think not.
All I propose, therefore, is that we stake our future on a new premise-that environmental problems are ethical problems. Much to the contrary of the criticisms of my fellow Justices, the Environment Agency need
not become a totalitarian mind control regime in order to fulfill this vision.
Rather, because ethical transformation is happening at the level of the individual citizen, I foresee and would encourage a rapid and broad decentralization of legal authority, so that people can make decisions about
their immediate environs that are consistent with their environmental ethics. I predict that when we invest that power in the citizens, it will not take
long for them to rediscover the ethical dimension of this question and
build moral tools as impressive as our technological ones. When that day
arrives, we will ask of the Environment Agency only that they facilitate
that political process and keep our national government honest to the
same biocentric ethic.
The other Justices are almost painstaking in their efforts to hide from
that beginning point. Justice Cosben's science of cost-benefit analysis, Justice Coasela's devotion to the free market, and Justice Ephsteid's worship
,of private property and limited government are manifestations of rationalist, positivist world views that are simply misfit to the challenges of the
future. They would require very little of society besides maximizing
human wealth and pleasure, no matter how much at the expense of the
environment. At the extreme in this regard is Justice Ephsteid, who criticizes me for bringing environmental ethics into the picture; yet she employs nothing less than a different set of ethics in her deluded call for the
restoration of a society of gentlemen farmers and pluralistic town meetings to overcome the widespread environmental degradation of postplacidium society. These Justices'and I simply do not speak the same
language, and I have little doubt that theirs will soon be the lost tongues.
Ironically, I am more concerned by the opinion of Justice Brandtlund
than I am by the three ideologues. At one time he acknowledged the ethical dimension of environmental policy in terms consistent with my approach, see Rivers Council v. Watth, 547 N.72d 94 (4301), but he since has
diluted those views in a futile attempt to strike what he naively calls the
balance between environment and economy. I fear he has deceived him-,
self, and that the apparent reasonableness of his seemingly evenhanded
approach will deceive others as well. The slogan of sustainable development will ring hollow without drastic reorientations of our population and
consumption patterns that will not permit much of Justice Brandtlund's
balancing act. That reality more than any other should convince us that we
are not, to use his words, stewards of the planet. The premise of human
superiority over all other living beings and all nonliving resources is outdated and deluded, and can no longer be used as a cover for what are
nothing less than immoral acts that serve only to sustain a bloated human
race. The environment is not our possession, our chattel, Our garden to
sow, or a even gift from some greater being. We are part of it-a mere
appendage of the larger organism-and it is far bigger than we will ever
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be. If it perishes, so do we. Hence,,we cannot afford to balance any socioeconomic objective against the duty we hold to the environment and all
other living beings 'as their equals.
Indeed, not even Justice Billarck's theme of environmental equity dissuades me from that view. Of course, there is no room for prejudice and
inequity in environmental policy, but I cannot countenance any subjugation of environmental protection in the name of sociological agendas and
politics. I could not, for example, approve of placing a landfill in an environmentally sensitive location simply to ensure that environmental harms
are evenly felt in the human population. I suspect Justice Billarck is not
advocating that extreme view, but I find it necessary to clarify the distinction between our approaches so as to make it clear that my starting point
is fundamentally one of environmental ethics, not sociopolitical ethics.
For the foregoing reasons, I find fault with the'Environment Agency's
order only with respect to the granting of permission to Glaxon to mine so
large a portion of the cave. I do not believe we need, much less deserve,
thirty more years of placidium, and our ethical duty to respect the inherent and intrinsic values of the placidium spores and the other species living in the cave-indeed, of the cave itself-outweigh any antiquated
notion of property interest Glaxon might assert. I would remand that portion of the order to the agency in order to require Glaxon andthe agency
to establish the compelling need to mine any placidium, a need that could
only exist if the entire planet, not just its human appendage, would be put
at risk. To the extent any such need is established sufficiently to warrant
jettisoning our ethical compass once again, then I would fully endorse the
agency's approach with respect to the conditions placed'on Glaxon for the
privilege of using the environment for human indulgence.
MR. JUSTICE BILLARCK delivered the following opinion.
How much longer will this Court and our other institutions of government pay lip service to distributional equity, while allowing racial and economic oppression to seep into every crevice of society including, as we
see in this case, environmental policy? Several of my colleagues are quick
to, ask whether the Environment Agency has served economic interests;
the others ask whether the agency has served environmental interests. It is
only when they are satisfied with the outcome on those fronts, however,
that they would turn to the question of the local residents. Their approaches, I fear, turn the, issue on its head.
The one accomplishment placidium cannot claim is the elimination of
economic, racial, and ethical prejudice in our society. Indeed, as the evidence Justice! presented to the Environment Agency amply demonstrated,
placidium has become a tool of such prejudice, as the poor, predominantly
minority communities around placidium mines have been left for millennia to deal with environmental ravages. I am glad to find myself in the
majority in reversing that tragic history by approving of the Environment
Agency's award of relocation and medical monitoring costs to the community around Whetmore Cave, but I am disturbed by some of the other Justices' reasons. Justice Coasela, for example, reaches that result only
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because to him the award approximates what could be expected under a
nuisance remedy. Chief Justice Cosben concludes, with unstated mathematics, that the award reflects a credible risk assessment and strikes a
reasonable balance of costs and benefits. Apparently, however, neither
Justice would ask whether the award is necessary simply as a matter of
social equity.
I realize, as Justice Ephsteid points out, that this case requires us only
to decide a framework for environmental policy, but that framework cannot be separated from the broader social fabric. To the extent economic,
racial, and ethnic prejudice and oppression run deep in our society-and
they surely do-we cannot escape their manifestations in all facets, of policy. Hence, unless this Court is willing to turn away from the oppressed
communities of poor, of people of color, and of ethnic minorities, it cannot ignore social equity issues even in this case of environmental policy
making. Environmental equity is but one head of the ugly monster of discrimination in this nation.
With that premise in mind, we must turn to the Environment Agency
as the vanguard of environmental equity. Its policies must be designed not
merely to facilitate environmental protection or economic development,
but to do so equitably and with distributional concerns in mind. All peoples are entitled to equality of environmental benefits, and environmental
harms must not be allowed to concentrate in oppressed populations. The
agency must ensure that the politically powerless and the economically
disadvantaged have a voice in the process, for if they do not, they will be
oppressed even more. No decision of environmental policy, no matter how
justified by costs and benefits, or efficient in the market, or respectful of
private property, or sensitive to future generations and the ethics of the
environment, should be allowed to proceed until we ensure that it is not a
mechanism for worsening the condition of the oppressed.
The other Justices truly do just pay lip service to that principle. It is
no excuse that social and political institutions of the economy ostensibly
are color and income blind, as Chief Justice Cosben claims of risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis and Justice Coasela claims of the market,
for as it works out that means simply that such institutions Will not stand
in the-way of prejudice or do anything about its insidious consequences. A
wealthy corporation does not need to have prejudice in mind when it muscles its way through government bureaus to get its permit to pollute, but
the effect of that happening time and again, eventually, is to leave those
without the means to make themselves heard yet further marginalized.
The aggregate economic progress, which a devout capitalist society
promises its people all too often, is distributed in ways that bear no relation to who bears the costs. I surely do not propose that we abandon those
institutions,, but merely that we instill in them the purpose of equitable
social outcomes.
Indeed, contrary to Justice Ephsteid's baseless fears, I do not advocate erosion of private property rights, so long as they are exercised in a
political. framework that prevents oppression, environmental or otherwise.
I do not believe, however, that such a framework will come about through
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reduced government involvement in social issues. Social policy is precisely where government needs to be pointed, the Environment Agency
included. Democracy and big government are not mutually exclusive; democracy and prejudice are.
I worry more, perhaps, about where Justices Brandtlund and Gaialis
would lead us by placing the environment so high on a pedestal that it may
cause us to overlook these deep social problems as much as worship of
the economy has. Do not mistake me, I place environmental protection in
high priority, but I am concerned that Justice Brandtlund's sustainable development framework, as vague and amorphous as it is, would eventually
turn into an excuse to put environment above all else. Justice Gaialis has
evidenced that predisposition already, in her criticism of the agency's order allowing Glaxon to access part of the, cave. How could it help the
equitable distribution of resources in this nation to deny society all of
whatever placidium is left?
The challenge, of course, is in ensuring that the rewards reaped and
costs imposed by the extraction of that placidium are equitably distributed, and I am moderately pleased with the agency's result in that regard.
Clearly, we need access to the placidium'in order to maintain social equity
for the next thirty years. I would reverse the agency to the extent the order precludes gaining access to the cave beyond that time, as we cannot
say where we will be thirty years hence. In the interim, however, relocation of the species to the temporarily preserved cave space is not an
unreasonable objective for environmental policy. Similarly, the requirement of the research funding ensures that society will begin the process of
searching for new sources of economic productivity and environmental
protection, the cost of which rightfully should fall on the beneficiary of
placidium profits.
The central concern of mine, of course, is the relocation and medical
monitoring award. Simply by virtue of the poor record of placidium mines
in the past, there is more than ample evidence in the record to support
such assistance to the local community. Although I cannot say on this record how much further the agency should have gone than that, it strikes me
that further would have been in order. As the price of ripping apart this
oppressed community's culture and way of life, would it be too much to
ask that Glaxon share its profits with the residents rather than just buy
them off? I would like to believe the Environment Agency can think that
progressively in the future. For the present, however, I would affirm this
element of the agency's order.
MR. JUSTICE CHOONBRAD delivered the following opinion.

My colleagues offer an array of interesting perspectives, from Druid
to Neanderthal and everything in between, for how to solve our placidium
dilemma. What none has endeavored to ask, however, is why this monumental decision has been left to the Environment Agency and, ultimately,
the courts. In my view, the very fact that this matter has progressed to this
point without one utterance of direction from the Legislature is proof posi-
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tive that the Environment Act constitutes an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority from the Legislature to the Environment Agency.
It is difficult to imagine a more extreme example of the Legislature
abdicating its central role as the decision maker in cases of tough political
choices. 'Chief Justice Cosben is alone among the other Justices in acknowledging that the question of legislative delegation is even one for review, concluding summarily that the Environment Act's direction that the
agency regulate in the "most appropriate" manner using the "most appropriate" standards somehow provides meaningful guidance to the agency in
its execution of the statute and to the courts in review thereof. But these
are legislative mirages, giving the appearance that the Legislature has
reached a solution to the political challenge but providing no direction at
all to the other branches of government as to 'what decision the Legislature has made. The six divergent opinions of my colleagues evidence that
what is the "most appropriate" regulatory solution in this case depends on
the beholder. Like it or not, when that is the case the beholder must be the
Legislature,.as the elected arm of the people, not some faceless bureaucracy or insular judicial court.
Accordingly, without offering the slightest indication of what I believe
is the "most appropriate" solution to Glaxon's case, I would find the Environment Act an unconstitutionally excessive delegation of legislative authority and vacate the decisions of the Environment Agency and the
courts below. If the Legislature wishes to dictate how Glaxon may or may
not use Whetmore Cave, let the Legislature tell us how.
ORDER

Because majorities of the divided Court have affirmed each separate
aspect of the Environment Agency's order, the decision of the Intermedi-.
ate Court is affirmed in all respects.
RECOMMENDED READING

The following books and articles are recommended as further readings in the field of environmental law, policy, and ethics. This list is not
intended to provide a comprehensive bibliography of.the topic, but rather
is a reflection of the sources that influenced my own depiction of the divergent themes in the Speluncean Polluters opinions. Most of the references include a significant legal analysis component rather than focusing
exclusively on policy and ethics. The omission of any work in the field of
environmental law, policy, and ethics, therefore, is not intended to suggest
it is either unimportant or unhelpful. Moreover, the inclusion of any work
under a particular heading by no means implies that the author agrees
with the positions taken in the corresponding Speluncean Polluters opinion, but rather that the work deals with the same subject matter in some
relevant and important way.
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Introductory Sources
Many treatments. of environmental law focus principally on just one
of the policy and ethics perspectives covered in the Spetuncean Polluters
opinions. Such works are listed under their appropriate headings below.
Several introductions to the topic, however, provide a comprehensive discussion including excerpts from important works representing each perspective. If a person new to the'field were to read nothing more than one
of these works, he or she would gain meaningful insight into the policy
and ethical perspectives that differentiate the six Speluncean Polluters
opinions. In particular, several recent anthologies are highly
recommended:
,AN

(Robert L.Fischman et al. eds., 1996).
(1992)..
OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1997).

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY

MICHAEL

C.

BLuMM, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

RICHARD L REVESZ, FOUNDATIONS

In reality of course, there are not six sharply differentiated '"camps"
of environmental perspectives. Rather, there is a ,spectrum of views, and
many commentators borrow and blend from among the arguments found
im each of the opinions. Hence,' to better appreciate the nuances of environmental perspectives and to become more versatile in the evaluation of
each, the following additional readings are recommended.
The Cost-Benefit and ComparativeRisk Assessment Methods
RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John

D.

Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 1995).
PETER ABELSON, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
KENNETH

J. ARROW

(1979).

ET AL., BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH,

AND SAFETY REGULATION:

A

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

(1996).'

Katharine K Baker, Consortingwith Forests: Rethinking Our Relationship to
NaturalResources and How We Should Value TheirLoss, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 677

(1995).
Brian R. Binger et al, The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 89 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1029 (1995).
Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L.REV. 269
(1989).

Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REGULATION,
Feb. 1981, at 33.

Jan/

Free Market Environmentalism and Other Market-Based Approaches
WILLIAM BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS? THE' CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLtTON (1974).
PAUL B. DOWNING, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY (1984)..
NICK HANLEY ET AL.,ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
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MERCURO ET AL., ECOLOGY,LAW, AND ECONOMICS: THE SIMPLE ANALYTICS

OF NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS

(1994).

DAVID W. PEARCE, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT

(1990).

R.

KERRY TURNER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS

(1993).

Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985).
Jesse H. Ausubel, Can Technology Spare the Earth?,SCIErm, Mar. 1, 1996, at
166.

Kenneth Boulding, The Economics of Spaceship Earth, in
QUALMrY IN A GROWING ECONOMY

ENVIRONMENTAL

(1971).

Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
Robert Costanza, Social Traps and Environmental Policy, 37 BioSci. 407
(1987).
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
Julian Simon, Resources, Population, Environment:An Oversupply of False
Bad News, 208 SCL 1431 (1980).
Robert N. Stavins & Bradley W. Whitehead, Dealing With Pollution: MarketBased Incentives for Environmental Protection,ENV'T, Sept. 1992, at 7.
Symposium, Free Market Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 297
(1992).

SustainableDevelopment and PrecautionaryPrinciples
AGENDA

21: THE EARTH

SUMMIT STRATEGY TO SAVE OUR PLANET

(Daniel Sitarz ed.,

1994).

A

SURVEY OF ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS

ECONOMICS: THE
ert Costanza ed., 1991)
ECOLOGICAL

KAI

N.

(Rajaram Krishnan et al. eds., 1995).

SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY

(Rob-

LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR THE

ENVIRONMENT

(1993).

MICHAEL MARIEN, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND SUSTAINABLE FUTURES
DAVID PEARCE ET AL., BLUEPRINT FOR A GREEN ECONOMiY

(1996).

(1989).

MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

(1988).

WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT

&

DEVELOPMENT,' OUR COMMON FUTURE

(1987) (The Brundtland Report).
Barry Commoner, Failure of the Environmental Effort, 18 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,195 (June 1988).,

R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management, 8
OGY 27 (1994).
Symposium, Ecology and the Law, 69 CH.-KENT L

REV.

CONSERVATION

847 (1994).
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Private PropertyRights and Libertarianism

RIGHTS To NATURE: ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, AND PoLITICAL PRINCILES OF INSTrruTIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (Susan Hanna et al. eds., i996).
RON ARNOLD

& ALAN

GOTTUEB, TRASHING THE ECONOMY: How RUNAWAY ENVIRON-

MENTALISM IS WRECKING AMERICA

(2d

ed.

1994)

DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCIETY
THROUGH LAND USE REGULATION
RICHARD

DOMAIN
WILLIAM

(1993).

A- EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1985).
A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS (1995).

AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

Richard 0. Brooks, Coercion to Environmental Virtue: Can and Should Law
Mandate Environmentally Sensitive Lifestyles?, 31 AM. J.' JuRis. 21 (1986).

Deep Ecology and EnvironmentalEthics
THIS SACRED
1996).

EARTH: RELIGION, NATURE, ENVIRONMENT (Roger S. Gottlieb ed.,

JAMES LOVELOcK, THE AGES OF GAIA: A BIOGRAPHY OF OUR LIVING EARTH

(1988).

LISA H. NEWTON & CATHERINE K DILLINGTON, WATERSHEDS 2: TEN CASES IN ENw_
RONMENTAL ETHICS (1997).
PAUL W. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A THEoRY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

(1986).
CHRISTOPHER

D.

STONE,

THE

GNAT is OLDER THAN MAN (1993).

EDWARD 0. WILSON, BIOPHILIA: THE HUMAN BOND WITH OTHER SPECIES (1984).

Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L REV. 1269 (1993).
James P. Karp, A Private PropertyDuty of Stewardship: Changing Our Land
Ethic, 23 ENvTL L. 735 (1993).
Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructinga Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1994).
Aldo Leopold, The Land Ethic, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (Ballantine Books

1970).
Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations
for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974).
Lynn White, Jr., The Future of Compassion, 30 ECUMENICAL REV. 99 (1978).

Environmental Justice
TIMOTHY BEATLY, ETHICAL LAND USE: PRINCIPLES OF POLICY AND PLANNING
KENNETH

J.

MANASTER,

(anthology).
DAVID E. NEWTON,

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION

AND

JUSTICE

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK

(1994).
(1995)

(1996).

UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND CoMMUNITIEs OF COLOR (Rob-

ert D. Bullard ed., 1994).
PETER S. WENZ, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1988).
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Vicki Been, Locally UndesirableLand Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: DisproportionateSiting or Market Dynamics, 103 Y~m L.J. 1383 (1994).
Symposium, UrbanEnvironmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 425 (1994).
Symposium, Race, Class, and EnvironmentalRegulation, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv.
839 (1992).
The Delegation Question
Many readers"undoubtedly will notice that there are seven opinions in
the essay, though it purported to present only six environmental perspectives. The seventh opinion is intended to remind us that any policy and
ethical perspective that might dominate the legal framework of environmental law must do so in way that is consistent with constitutional and
other structural limitations on government generally. Indeed, there are at
least as many perspectives on the proper political design of environmental
law-issues of federalism, due process, administrative powers, and so
on-as there are regarding the underlying policy and ethical perspectives.
The Essay presents one such perspective on an issue relevant to each of
the branches of government-the permissible extent of delegation of legislative authority to administrative agencies. Readings on that topic that
shaped the Speluncean Polluters opinion include:
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHouT RESPONsIBLrY
CASS SUNsTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION

(1993).

(1990).

Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the AdministrativeState, 107 HARv. L
1231 (1994).
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